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historical and geographical reality. His income-based estimates start with the daily real wages 
of adult males and assume that days worked per year were constant. Those advanced in British 
economic growth (BEG) make no such assumption and instead are built up from the output 
side. They correlate better with population trends and are consistent with an economy slowly 
JURZLQJ DQG EHFRPLQJ ULFKHU &ODUN¶V GHQLDO WKDt such growth occurred, his assertion that 
substantially more land must have been under arable cultivation, his belief that conditions of 
full employment invariably prevailed in the countryside at harvest time, his concern that the 
wage bill would have exceeded the value of output in BEG, his refusal to consider the 
possibility that the working year was of variable length, and his assertion that output per acre 
must have been equalised across arable and pasture are all shown to be figments of his 
µ0DOWKXVGHOXVLRQ¶1  
In A farewell to alms, Gregory Clark advanced the view that England, along with all other pre-
modern economies, was caught in an eternal Malthusian trap, in which all economic progress 
was ultimately absorbed by increases in population, from which it only escaped into self-
sustaining growth late on in the industrialising process towards the end of the nineteenth 
century.2 Since then, a growing body of evidence has shown that England, in company with a 
handful of other European economies, was escaping from Malthusian constraints and slowly 
raising national income per head well before the onset of the industrial revolution. The case in 
support of the latter view is set out most clearly in Broadberry, Campbell, Klein, Overton and 
van Leeuwen, British economic growth 1270-1870 (henceforth BEG), which is why Clark now 
takes issue with the output-based agricultural production estimates advanced in that book and 
asserts, instead, the superiority of his own income-based estimates.3 In defence of his 
stagnationist position, Clark asserts, first, that BEG overstates the growth of English 
agricultural output in the long term, and second, that by massively underestimating the amount 
of land under arable cultivation it underestimates by almost half aggregate agricultural output 
µIRUPRVWRI WKH \HDUVEHIRUH¶.4 To these fundamental issues, Clark adds a number of 
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second order criticisms, based on claims of inconsistency. This response explains why these 
criticisms fail.  
I     &ODUN¶VHVWLPDWHRIDJULFXOWXUDORXWSXW 
Until the advent of significant net food imports in the nineteenth century, it is reasonable to 
suppose that, subject to some adjustments to its composition, the output of English agriculture 
must more-or-less have kept pace with population. Certainly, that is the conclusion of BEG and 
it is borne out by the annual growth estimates of agricultural output and population summarised 
in Table 1 and graphed in Figure 1. Over the period 1300-1870 the correlation between both 
sets of growth rates was +0.94 while between 1270 and 1870 agricultural output and population 
both grew at 0.3 per cent per annum, resulting in per capita agricultural output growth over 
these six centuries of zero. Unsurprisingly, agricultural output growth was negative during the 
century or more of demographic retrenchment initiated by the Black Death, recovered to 0.48 
per cent in the sixteenth century (when the population was growing at 0.63 per cent), slowed 
to 0.3 per cent in the seventeenth century but then accelerated to 0.7 per cent in the eighteenth 
century when it was increasing faster than the population. Clark may choose to characterise the 
resultant output JURZWKDVµenormous¶ but in reality agricultural output barely kept pace with 
population over these six centuries.5  
Compared with industry and services, agriculture remained the slowest growing sector 
both before and after 1700, in an economy with a GDP per capita growth rate of just 0.17 per 
cent per annum between 1270 and 1700 and 0.48 per cent between 1700 and 1870. More 
important were the improvements made to labour productivity in agriculture, which from 1522 
to 1700 grew faster than that in industry (0.13 per cent compared to 0.07 per cent) and from 
1700 to 1759 faster than that in both industry and services (0.57 per cent compared to 0.32 per 
cent and 0.26 per cent) and thereby allowed labour, provisions and raw materials to be released 
to these other more dynamic sectors upon whose growth that of the wider economy depended.6 
This is a story of slow evolution rather than rapid revolution. Clark nevertheless disbelieves 
that VXFKDµUHPDUNDEOHLQFUHDVHLQRXWSXW¶FRXOGKDYHRFFXUUHG7 
Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 










information on labour supply, wages and farm rents, benchmarked against absolute output 
levels in the late 1860s obtained from the Agricultural returns for Great Britain and then 
projected back as index numbers from there (Figure 2A). Implied growth rates (Table 1 and 
Figure 1) fall within a narrower range than those calculated by BEG and, with the conspicuous 
exception of the fourteenth century, tend to be slower. The fit with population growth rates is 
DOVROHVVWLJKWHVSHFLDOO\GXULQJWKHµJROGHQDJHRIODERXU¶WKDWIROORZHGWKH%ODFN'HDWKZKHQ
the daily real wage rates of adult males gained by more than GDP per head, and again during 
WKHµEQJHOV¶SDXVH¶RIWKHHLJKWHHQWKFHQWXU\, when gains in daily real wage rates lagged behind 
those in GDP per head.8 2Q&ODUN¶VILJXUHVWKHabsence of any significant output decline during 
the fourteenth century, when the population shrank by at least half and land began to lapse from 
cultivation, is one paradox; the meagreness of output growth during the eighteenth century, 
when the population increased by 70 per cent and most other commentators estimate that 
agricultural output approximately doubled, another.9 Both paradoxes suggest that there are 
SUREOHPVZLWK&ODUN¶V figures. 
Figure 2 about here 
,WFDQEHQRFRLQFLGHQFHWKDWWKHVHWZRPDMRUDQRPDOLHVLQ&ODUN¶VDJULFXOWXUDORXWSXW
series occurred when the daily real wage rates of adult males were SDUWLFXODUO\µXQUHDO¶.10 Their 
combined effect is artificially to inflate all his pre-1800, and especially pre-1700, output 
estimates, with the magnitude of that inflation increasing the further back in time that he goes. 
This point is graphically illustrated by Figure 2B which re-indexes the Clark and the BEG 
output series against base year 1700 = 100. Clark may think that the key discrepancy between 
his agricultural output estimates and those presented in BEG occurs in the medieval period, but 
that is mainly an illusion created by indexing the two series against their shared end date of 
1860s = 100. In fact, over the 400 years 1300-1700 annual rates of output growth according to 
the two series were little different: 0.11 per cent (Clark) and 0.13 per cent (BEG). Instead, it is 
after 1700 that the two series diverge most widely, with respective annual growth rates of 0.04 
                                                          
8
 +DWFKHUµ8QUHDOZDJHV¶$OOHQµ(QJHOV¶SDXVH¶%URDGEHUU\DQGRWKHUVBritish economic growth, pp. 258-63, 
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per cent and 0.70 per cent for the eighteenth century. Retrospectively, it is from the eighteenth 
century that &ODUN¶VEDFN-projection of output trends begin to go awry and this error is then 
further compounded by the unnatural buoyancy of his series following the Black Death.11 The 
problem, therefore, is not that the pre-1700 output estimates of BEG are µVXEVWDQWLDOO\ too low¶ 
EXWWKDW&ODUN¶VDUHsubstantially too high.12 The explanation for this lies in the basis upon which 
his output series has been constructed. 
&ODUN¶V HVWLPDWHV RI agricultural output, like his estimates of national income, are 
derived from the income side and both are powerfully influenced by the daily wage-rate series 
that he uses.13 For adult male wage earners, he assumes a constant 300 days worked per year, 
so that the daily real wage rate is multiplied by this constant figure to infer the annual earnings 
of male labourers. The fallacy of this assumption is highlighted in BEG, where it is shown that 
the length of the working year conceivably varied from a minimum of 165 days in the aftermath 
of the Black Death to a maximum of over 300 days at the height of the industrial revolution 
when there were strong incentives for workers to labour PRUHµLQGXVWULRXVO\¶, a point recently 
HQGRUVHG E\ +XPSKULHV DQG :HLVGRUI¶s independent assessment of the length of the male 
working year.14 By failing to allow earnings to rise in line with the lengthening of the work 
year, Clark seriously underestimates the growth of agricultural incomes. His estimates of 
agricultural output derived from the income side are therefore intrinsically flawed and those 
for the late-medieval period are seriously wide of the mark. He can only make them fit by 
claiming that almost 50 per cent more land was under arable cultivation in 1290 than the 
maximum of 12.75 million acres proposed by BEG. By so doing, he compounds the effects of 
unreal wage rates with unrealistic assumptions about English agricultural land use. 
II     Geographical and historical limits on the arable acreage in 1290 
Before 1866 there are many estimates of the arable acreage but they all suffer from problems 
of definition, representativeness and accuracy. Thereafter the annual Agricultural returns for 
Great Britain become available. The first returns had some teething problems so BEG uses 
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data from the 1871 survey which show that England contained 13.83 million acres of arable 
land and 9.65 million acres of permanent pasture or grass plus commons, heaths, orchards, 
woodland and extensive amounts of low-grade mountain land.15 Arable here is taken to mean 
land under all kinds of crops, including grasses under rotation as well as bare fallow. In the 
opinion of Gregory King, England and Wales had contained around 11 million acres of arable 
land in the 1690s, of which England probably accounted for just under 10 million acres.16 Six 
centuries earlier the number of tenants and land holdings enumerated in the Domesday Survey 
of 1086 imply that the population estimated by BEG at approximately 1.71 million maintained 
around 5.5-6.0 million acres of tillage.17 By 1290 BEG proposes that the arable area had 
expanded to 12.75 million acres but Clark considers this to be a massive underestimation and 
prefers instead a figure of at least 18 million acres.18 This is more than treble the current 
Domesday estimate, 5.25 million acres more than the BEG estimate, 7 million acres more than 
*UHJRU\.LQJ¶VHVWLPDWHIRUEngland and Wales in the 1690s and 4.27 million acres more than 
were under the plough in 1871. So vast an area would inevitably have included much land that 
was marginal for arable cultivation and inferior in productivity and could only have been 
brought under the plough at the expense of other land uses, most obviously grassland of one 
sort or another. Yet maintaining so much extra land in cultivation would have required an 
additional 0.33 million working animals plus the breeding stock needed to reproduce them and 
patently could not have been at the expense of the several million acres of grassland that 
supported the national flock of over 10 million sheep growing wool for export.  
7KHDJURQRPLFLPSOLFDWLRQVRIKLVFODLPKDYHSODLQO\QRWHQWHUHG&ODUN¶VFDOFXODWLRQV
2QKLVUHFNRQLQJSHUFHQWRIWKHPLOOLRQDFUHVWKDWPDNHXS(QJODQG¶VODQGPDVVDQG
SHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VSRWHQWLDODJULFXOWXUDODUHDZRXOGKave been in tillage cultivation 
at this medieval peak in agricultural output. That circumstances of climate, topography and 
soils have always rendered much of the English landscape inherently unsuitable for the 
cultivation of crops, particularly in the hilly, cool and rainy north and west of the country, is 
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clearly to him beside the point. Nor is he concerned that substantial amounts of land were also 
needed for other purposes, specifically meadow and pasture to support and reproduce the large 
numbers of draught animals employed in arable cultivation and for livestock production in 
general, woodland for timber and the production of fuel (at a time when there was almost total 
reliance upon firewood for thermal energy), and forests, chases and parks for the recreational 
activities of the landed elite.19 The same applies to the roles of forest law and common rights 
² both close to their maximum territorial extents c.1300 ² as powerful institutional 
constraints upon the scale of arable cultivation.20 All of this he disregards in his vain endeavour 
to demonstrate WKDWDJULFXOWXUH¶VµDFWXDORXWSXWOHYHOVPust have been nearly double Broadberry 
et al.¶V HVWLPDWHVLQWKH\HDUVEHIRUH¶.21 
Yet the real geographical, institutional and economic constraints within which English 
agriculture operated cannot be ignored. Taking due account of these hard realities, BEG 
therefore proposed that: 
µAs a rule of thumb, England had a potential agricultural area of 24 million 
acres, divided roughly equally between arable and grass, with more tillage than 
pasture in the south and east and vice versa in the north and west. Even after 
partial substitution of temporary grass for permanent pastures, around 40 per 
cent of the agricultural area remained XQGHUSHUPDQHQW JUDVV«VR WKDW WKH
FRXQWU\¶VSRWHQWLDODUDEOHDUHDZDVDWPRVWPLOOLRQDFUHVHTXLYDOHQWWR
per cent of the national land area.¶22 
This is broadly consistent with a farmed area of 23.72 million acres in 1871, a figure that 
remained remarkably constant thereafter, and with *UHJRU\.LQJ¶Vearlier estimate that at the 
close of the seventeenth century England and Wales contained approximately 11 million acres 
of arable land and a roughly similar amount of grassland, plus commons, woodland, parks and 
forests.23 Back in 1290 there are good reasons to believe that England actually contained more 
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arable land than it would do four centuries later, more even than in 1801, but not as much as in 
1871. At all these dates, however, broad continuities prevailed in the relative balance struck 
between arable and pastoral land uses and in the geographical distribution of arable cultivation, 
albeit with due allowance for certain well known regional discontinuities.  
Net changes in the total arable acreage, 1290-1871 
On the figures set out in BEG, a net addition of approximately 1.10 million acres was made to 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VDUDEOHDUHDEHWZHHQDQG LQFRQWUDVW WR WKHQHW UHGXFWLRQRIRYHU
million acres advocated by Clark. Over the intervening six centuries additions to the arable 
area came from reclamation of wetland, the under-drainage of heavy land, the reclamation of 
light land, plus disafforestation and the clearance of woodland. Offsetting these gains were 
losses from laying arable down to grass in response to changing relative prices, from 
encroachments by the expanding built up area, and from the incorporation of farmland into 
landscaped parks reserved for recreational use. BEG gives estimates for the scale of some of 
these land-use changes but not all and the assumption was made that in most instances they 
cancelled each other out. This exercise is refined here, paying particular attention to land-use 
changes associated with different soil types, yielding the results shown in Table 2.24 
Table 2 about here 
Rows B1 to B4 of Table 2 quantify the main net additions to the arable area between 
1290 and 1871. The drainage of marshland has been well documented and Grigg uses a figure 
of 1.39 million acres drained in England from a paper by Marshall and others: in fact their 
estimate is higher at 1.98 million acres.25 Measuring the areas of marshland from the soil map 
reproduced by Overton gives 2.3 million acres.26 Not all of this was converted to arable when 
drained and in the 1930s some 55 per cent was under arable.27 Thus arable gains from the 
drainage of marshland are estimated at 1.3 million acres (Table 2 Row B1).  Additionally, there 
was considerable soil under-drainage from the 1840s. About 11.3 million acres of England are 
classed as heavy land and estimates of the area drained by the 1870s range from 4.5 to 10 
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 Overton, Agricultural revolution, p. 58. 
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million acres.28 The lower estimate is from Phillips, who considers that most of this newly 
drained land was already under arable cultivation, so that only 0.10 million acres were added 
to the arable by this method (Table 2, row B2).29  
Reclamation of light land was a feature of agricultural development from the late 
seventeenth century onwards. Indeed, the classic Norfolk four-course rotation of the 
µDJULFXOWXUDOUHYROXWLRQ¶ZDVLQVWUXPHQWDOLQEULQJLQJWKHOLJKWODQGVRI(DVW$QJOLDWKHFKDON
downs of southern England, the Lincoln Heaths and the Yorkshire Wolds under the plough.30 
This process has been described in many regional and local studies and it is likely that at least 
1.0 million of the 4.0 million acres characterised as light land switched from pasture to arable 
(Table 2, row B3).31 
Progressive substitution of coal for firewood from the sixteenth century also allowed 
much woodland to be converted to agricultural land uses. Overton puts the area of England that 
was wooded at around 10 per cent in 1350, which is probably a lower-bound estimate but is 
further complicated by the fact that land under forest law was not necessarily wooded, so that 
extensive post-medieval disafforestation mainly lifted restrictions on land use.32 King put 
woodland at 7.7 per cent of the land area and by 1871 it had fallen to 4 per cent.33 Sticking with 
the lower-bound medieval figure suggests that about 2 million acres of woodland, much of it 
on inferior soils, were lost, of which under half ² 0.8 million acres ² was sufficiently fertile 
to justify the substantial costs incurred in its conversion to arable cultivation Table 2, row B4).34  
Compared with aggregate arable gains of approximately 3.2 million acres, net losses 
were smaller and amounted to around 2.1 million acres. There is no doubt that there was 
considerable conversion of arable to pasture between the middle ages and the late nineteenth 
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century, particularly during the era of parliamentary enclosure, and arable ridge and furrow 
now fossilised under pasture bear witness to this.35 In BEG it is shown how this conversion was 
mostly concentrated in a narrow range of counties lying along the boundary between the 
predominantly arable-farming counties of the southeast and the more pastoral counties of the 
north and west and mainly took place between 1380 and 1500 and again after 1650.36 Clark, 
picking up on a conference paper by Williamson, reports that some 63 per cent of 
Northamptonshire was arable c.1300 and 45 per cent in 1871 (a loss of only 0.11 million acres) 
and wonders whether this may have been representative of England.37 A further 0.3 million 
acres may similarly have been removed in Leicestershire, southeast Warwickshire and the clay 
vales of Buckinghamshire. Yet in other midland counties (Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire and 
Huntingdonshire), Williamson and others point out that enclosures were seldom followed by 
large-scale conversion to grass.38 Thus Northamptonshire is clearly not representative of all 
enclosed heavy land.39 Given that other areas of the country saw the conversion of arable to 
pasture, total losses from this land-use switch have been estimated at 0.80 million acres (Table 
2 row C1). 
 Apart from the substitution of one agricultural land use for another, there were 
permanent losses to the agricultural area from the expansion of the built-up area and 
intensification of transport networks. These losses may have been locally significant but 
nationally were quite modest. Between 1290 and 1850 the urban population of England 
increased by a little over 8 million.40At an urban population density of approximately 7 persons 
per acre, urban expansion would therefore have consumed around 1.1 million acres of land, 
although not all of this would have been arable.41 Further losses arose from elaboration of the 
FRXQWU\¶VWUDQVSRUWQHWZRUNTaking the mileage of turnpike trusts as an indicator of investment 
in roads outside towns yields a figure of around 20,000 miles by their peak period of the 
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1830s.42 Even in the unlikely scenario where they had all been driven through prime farmland, 
this would still have resulted in a trivial loss of arable acres, given the width of the roads. The 
figures for canals are even smaller, with Duckham suggesting a peak mileage for inland 
waterways in the mid nineteenth century of around 1,400 miles for rivers and 2,600 miles for 
canals.43 In contrast, tKH H[WHQW RI %ULWDLQ¶V UDLOZD\ QHWZRUN LQ  ZDV  PLOHV44 
Allowing a generous 2 acres per mile (implying a line width of 5.5 yards), and ignoring the 
fact that many lines passed through urban areas, would result in a loss of less than 28,000 acres, 
only some of which would have been arable. At most, therefore, around 20,000 acres of arable 
land may have been forfeited to roads, canals and railways. Overall, therefore, post-1290 arable 
losses to urbanisation and development are unlikely to have exceeded 1 million acres (Table 2, 
row C2). 
 Potentially greater losses occurred from the fashionable creation of landscaped parks. 
Prince uses early twentieth-century Ordnance Survey maps to assess the percentages of total 
land area devoted to parkland, showing a sharp decline from 17.5 per cent within a 1 to 15 mile 
UDGLXVRI/RQGRQZKHUHJHQWOHPHQ¶VVHDWVKDGSUROLIHUDWHGXQGHUPHWURSROLWDQLQIluence, to 
8.5 per cent within a 15 to 30 mile radius and 4.0 per cent outside a 30 mile radius of the 
capital.45 At a far greater remove from London, Goodchild reports that parkland accounted for 
4 per cent of Nottinghamshire and 1.9 per cent of the West Riding of Yorkshire.46 Extrapolating 
from these figures suggests that by 1871 private parks occupied less than 5 per cent of 
(QJODQG¶VWRWDOODQGDUHDRUDURXQGPLOOLRQDFUHV,WLVFOHDUKRZHYHUWKDWWKHYDVWPDMRULW\
of this land was not previously in arable use. Indeed, Prince emphasises that parkland was 
especially concentrated on land of poor soil quality, ill-suited to agricultural use and for this 
reason often clustered in the vicinity of former royal forests and private chases.47 Numbers of 
the greatest parks were of medieval origin and the inquisitiones post mortem (IPMs) indicate 
that parkland was already established as a distinctive land use by the beginning of the 
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fourteenth century, when probably over 3,000 parks were in existence.48 Parkland was plainly 
a beneficiary of the process of disafforestation, probably expanding by between 0.5 and 0.75 
million acres between 1290 and 1871. The net loss of arable land to landscaped parks is 
therefore likely to have been of the order of 0.30 million acres (Table 2, row C3). 
 Working back from an arable acreage of 13.83 million acres for 1871 in row A of Table 
2, and taking account of both the net arable gains since 1290 in rows B1 to B4 and the net 
arable losses in rows C1 to C3, yields the figure of 12.73 million arable acres for 1290 in row 
D. Since the net gains to the arable area from disafforestation and reclamation of the heaviest 
and lightest soils are more likely to have been underestimated than the net losses, this figure 
should be regarded as an upper-bound estimate and highlights how historically unfounded is 
the arable acreage of between 18.0 and 19.4 million acres in 1290, as postulated by Clark. For 
him to be correct, he would need to be able to explain not only the loss of over 4 million acres 
by 1871 but also the more astonishing losses of nearly 7 million acres by 1801 (at a time of 
maximum national need during the Napoleonic Wars, when the arable area was 11.35 million 
acres) and over 8 million acres by the 1690s (the last an amount of land equivalent in area to 
the six northernmost counties of England). Curiously, the withdrawal of such a vast amount of 
land from arable cultivation has wholly escaped the attention of historians.49 The onus is 
therefore on Clark to produce convincing empirical evidence that these millions of acres of 
µORVW¶DUDEOHKDGHYHUH[LVWHGDQGVKRZZKHUHH[DFWO\WKH\ZHUHORFDWHGJHQHUDOLVLQJIURPWKH
occasional anecdotal example will not suffice. 
Geographical continuities in arable land use 1086 to 1871 
In England the balance struck between arable and pastoral land uses always exhibited much 
geographical variation. This was as pronounced in 1086 as it would be in 1871 and reflected 
the immutable nature of the environmental factors shaping land use. Self-evidently, too, for as 
long as working animals and humans provided the bulk of all animate power employed in 
agriculture, the distributions of rural population and arable land use tended to march together.  
The relative and absolute amounts of arable land in 1086 can be derived using the same 
method as for 1290 but with the critical difference that recorded numbers of Domesday plough 
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teams provide a crosscheck on the results thereby obtained (Table 3). The starting point for 
these new estimates is the county distribution of population as reported in BEG.50 This is then 
combined with the lowland acreage of each county, excluding land above 200 metres, since 
this is taken to be the normal altitudinal limit to grain production. Allocating 3.17 arable acres 
per head for a total population of 1.71 million, yields a total of 5.41 million arable acres, which 
is just sufficient to feed a population of that size with grain yields at medieval levels.51 The 
regional distribution of lowland arable acres per head is then allowed to vary on a sliding scale 
from 1.50 in the most densely populated county of Middlesex to 4.25 in the least populous 
counties, on the assumption that the lower the population density the more extensive were the 
cultivation methods employed (with more fallow and lower yields). Table 3 summarises the 
results, expressed in as a percentage of the total lowland acreage, for eight regional county 
groupings. As will be seen from the final column of Table 3, they are in broad agreement with 
the recorded distribution of plough teams per 1,000 lowland acres (correlation coefficient = 
+0.96).52 
Table 3 about here 
In 1086 plough-team densities were highest in the southwest and west midlands and 
some 5-15 per cent lower in the eastern counties, whose significantly higher population 
densities nonetheless imply that at least as much land was under arable land use. Nor were the 
populous southeastern counties far behind.  In fact, across a broad swathe of eastern, 
southeastern and central England tillage cultivation accounted for a quarter of all lowland land-
use by 1086 and, wherever this was the case, plough-team densities were correspondingly high.  
Arable land use appears to have been less developed in the southwest, where densities of 
population and plough teams were both lower, and was least developed throughout the north 
of England, where marked scarcities of tenants and teams bear witness to the scorched earth 
policy so recently meted out by William I and his armies.53 Collectively, (QJODQG¶V HLJKW
QRUWKHUQPRVWFRXQWLHVFRQWDLQHGDTXDUWHURIWKHFRXQWU\¶VORZODQGEXWDIWHUDOORZDQFHIRUWKH
un-surveyed counties of Cumberland, Westmorland, Northumberland and Durham, only 
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approximately 8 per cent of its plough teams and 9 per cent of its arable land. In 1086 political 
factors had therefore exaggerated the natural contrast between a closely settled tillage-based 
south and east and a less populous pastoral-based north and southwest. Nevertheless, as will 
be plain from Table 4, even after these losses had been made good, this divide has remained 
RQHRIWKHPRVWLQGHOLEOHIHDWXUHVRI(QJODQG¶VDJULFXOWXUDOJHRJUDSK\54  
Table 4 about here 
 Eight centuries later the Agricultural returns capture agricultural land use at the point 
when price incentives to maximise domestic food production remained strong, disafforestation 
and enclosure had largely run their separate courses, and farmers possessed the technology to 
cultivate some of the FRXQWU\¶VKHDYLHVWand most intractable soils, so that arable thus accounted 
for an impressive SHUFHQWRIWKHDJULFXOWXUDODUHDDQGSHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VWRWDO
area. Table 4 demonstrates that in 1871, as in 1086, the most arable region was the eastern 
counties, where 63.0 per cent of the total acreage was devoted to arable, rising to a national 
maximum of 75.6 per cent in Cambridgeshire where extensive drainage had allowed much 
former peat fenland to be brought into productive use.55 At the opposite extreme, just 24.5 per 
cent of the total acreage was devoted to arable in the northwest and 34.1 per cent in the 
northeast. Here, for all the progress made incorporating fodder crops and sown grasses into 
arable rotations, permanent grassland remained a prominent component of land use. This 
unevenness in the relative distributions of arable and grassland echoed the situation in 1086 
and did so for much the same geographical reasons, now powerfully reinforced by commercial 
specialisation according to comparative advantage. Arable had made some notable net gains, 
most conspicuously in the north, but, as already noted, had lost ground to pastoral land uses in 
the midlands. 
In certain respects the 1801 crop returns, compiled at a time of acute pressure upon 
national food supplies but prior to the boost to arable cultivation from technological advances 
such as under-drainage and the final surge of parliamentary enclosures of commons and waste, 
provide a more appropriate basis for comparison with the corresponding situation in 1290.56  
They are better at revealing the relative rather than absolute amount of land under arable 
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cultivation and confirm that the most arable counties were located in East Anglia and the 
southeast and the most pastoral in the northwest and the southwest. The continuity with the 
situation seven centuries earlier is again striking, although the withdrawal of land from arable 
cultivation in parts of the midlands is already evident (Table 4). On the assumption of a national 
arable area of 11.35 million acres, the proportion of land under arable rotations in 1801 ranged 
from a minimum of 13.2 per cent in Lancashire to a maximum of 65.1 per cent in Suffolk.57  
 At all three dates, 1086, 1801 and 1871, the proportion of land under arable rotations 
varied a great deal geographically (Table 4). The lowest shares were consistently in the hilly, 
cool and rainy north, northwest and southwest where, by the nineteenth century, arable land 
typically comprised between a fifth and a quarter of the total. Proportions two to three times as 
JUHDWSUHYDLOHGLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VSUHPLHUJUDLQ-producing regions, namely East Anglia and the 
southeast, but only exceptionally exceeded two-thirds of the land area of individual counties 
and rarely if ever exceeded three-quarters in even the most favoured individual localities.58 
Strong regional contrasts in land use and the relative size of the arable sector were thus an 
abiding feature of English agriculture, reflecting the real environmental, institutional and 
economic constraints that shaped production59. Reliance upon organic methods of production 
and animate sources of power meant that grassland, whether several or common, enclosed or 
unenclosed, improved or unimproved, was always a significant land use in its own right and 
was undoubtedly at its most important prior to the incorporation of fodder crops into arable 
rotations from the seventeenth century. +HQFH*UHJRU\.LQJ¶VYLHZWKDWLQWKHVWKHUHZDV
just under an acre of grassland for each acre of arable, although that ratio undoubtedly varied 
a good deal from region to region.60 The situation can have been little different in 1290 when 
the country stocked an estimated 0.4 million horses, 2.24 million cattle (including working 
oxen), 15.7 million sheep and almost 1 million swine, with all but the pigs and the more 
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expensive cart and riding horses dependent for the bulk of their sustenance upon grass in one 




III     Some logical puzzles raised by Clark 
Clark bolsters his disregard for the geographical and historical realities that underpin the BEG 
estimates of the arable area with a number of logical assertions intended to justify a 
substantially higher estimate. None, however, withstands serious scrutiny. 
Harvest labour 
First, Clark argues that the level of arable output in BEG before 1750 would have been 
insufficient to keep the agricultural labour force fully employed at harvest time, which he takes 
as an established fact because of the existence of a substantial harvest wage premium.62 This 
disregards the large elements of customary behaviour in the medieval labour market, where 
money wages changed remarkably little over periods of half a century or longer, a fact that can 
be overlooked when attention is focused primarily on real wages, which fluctuated through 
changes in prices.63 It also ignores the simple point that, with double the available daylight 
KRXUVDGD\¶VZRUNGXULQJWKHKDUYHVWSHULRGZDVVXEVWDQWLDOO\ORQJHUWKDQGXULQJWKHZLQWHU
and involved entirely different tasks that had to be carried out within strict time constraints. 
Clark also plays down the strenuous nature of those harvesting tasks, even though in arable 
parishes marriages were often postponed until after the harvest was over (in contrast to the 
spring marriage peak in pastoral parishes, following hay-making, calving and lambing).64 These 
factors of customary wage rates, longer hours, different tasks performed under time pressure, 
and the different balance between arable and pastoral activities in different regions make the 
relative constancy of the harvest premium over the winter wage rate easy to understand, without 
the need to invoke the permanent persistence of conditions of full employment at harvest time.65  
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Table 5 about here 
More seriously, &ODUN¶VFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHQXPEHURIKDUYHVWGD\VDYDLODEOHSHUPDQLQ
his Table 3 is flawed.66 For the level of output taken from BEG, KHVWDWHVWKDWµIRUWKH\HDUV
1770- WKH ODERXU UHTXLUHPHQWSHUPDQ IRU WKHKDUYHVW WDVNV DYHUDJHGGD\V¶ VR WKLV
represented full employment from the eighteenth century onwards, but significant under-
employment before then.67 This result, which is shown in the first column of Table 5, depends 
crucially on the allocation of all male workers in agriculture to arable tasks, irrespective of the 
fact that the pastoral sector accounted for between 42.2 and 63.8 per cent of the value of 
agricultural output. ,QWKHWKLUGFROXPQRI7DEOH&ODUN¶VHVWLPDWHVRIWRWDOKDUYHVWGD\VSHU
man have therefore been reworked using the same assumptions for the total harvest days, but 
allocating the male farm labour force in agriculture between the arable and pastoral sectors in 
proportion to their shares of current price output (as shown in the second column). This results 
in around 30 days of harvest labour per man in the low demand years, and considerably more 
in the other years. In short, using the same numerator as Clark, but a more realistic denominator 
completely removes the alleged problem of insufficient demand to keep the available male 
labour force fully employed during the medieval period. 
Wages and the value of output 
The lack of the consistency between daily real wages and GDP per capita is dealt with at some 
length at the aggregate level in BEG, where it is shown that the discrepancy between the trends 
in the two series can be explained primarily by variation in the days worked per year, with 
VXEVLGLDU\UROHVIRUFKDQJHVLQWKHUHODWLYHSULFHRIIRRGDQGODERXU¶VVKDUHRI*'368 This issue 
can also be addressed at the sectoral level, with Clark arguing that in agriculture the annual 
earnings per worker would have exceeded BEG¶VHVWLPDWHGRXWSXWSHUZRUNHUduring the late-
medieval period.69 In fact, as set out in Table 6, it is straightforward to show that this was not 
the case.  
Table 6 about here 
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The first step in estimating labour income in English agriculture is to establish the size 
of the agricultural labour force. This is set out in part A of Table 6, starting from the estimated 
size of the English population and share of the agricultural share of the labour force set out in 
BEG.70 Although this can reasonably be used as an index of employment in agriculture, it needs 
to be adjusted to take account of annual days worked per person before it can be used as an 
index of total days worked in agriculture. Days worked per person are also taken from BEG, 
based on the work of Allen and Weisdorf.71 The next step, in part B of Table 6, is to combine 
the index of total days worked with an index of the daily wage rate to arrive at an index of 
wage payments. The daily wage rate is taken from Clark, so that no difference can arise on that 
score.
72
 Multiplying the index of total days worked from part A with the daily wage rate index 
yields an index of wage payments. Part B also provides data on the nominal value of 
agricultural output from BEG.73 Finally, Part C of Table 6 derives an index of the wage share 
of output under the alternative assumptions of either an industrious revolution or a fixed 300-
day working year. The results are expressed as the percentage of output accounted for by wage 
SD\PHQWVEHQFKPDUNLQJ WKH LQGH[RQ&ODUN¶V ILJXUHRIFLUFDSHUFHQW LQ74 This is 
VRPHZKDWKLJKHU WKDQ$OOHQ¶V ILJXUHRISHU FHQWEXW WR HQVXUH FRPSDUDELOLW\&ODUN¶V
higher figure is again accepted.75 Note that LQWKHDEVHQFHRIDQLQGXVWULRXVUHYROXWLRQODERXU¶V
share of output would indeed have been much higher in the late-medieval period, although only 
in the 1450s would it have consumed more than the whole of output, and by a much smaller 
SURSRUWLRQWKDQVXJJHVWHGE\&ODUN¶V)LJXUH&ODUN¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHDJULFXOWXUDORXWSXW
series in BEG necessarily implies a wage bill that is greater than the value of output is thus 
UHMHFWHG7KHSUREOHPDULVHVRQO\EHFDXVHRI&ODUN¶VUHIXVDOWRFRXQWHQDQFHDQLQFUHDVHLQGD\V
ZRUNHGSHU\HDU7KLVOHDGVWR&ODUN¶VQH[WSX]]OHWKHSUH-industrial work year. 
The pre-industrial work year 
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Clark claims that since the harvest wage premium remained constant between 1270 and 1870, 
then the length of the work year must also have remained constant. 76 First, he argues that the 
harvest wage premium is an indication that all agricultural workers must have been fully 
employed during the harvest season, although, as noted above, the existence of a harvest 
premium was not necessarily dependent on full employment. Second, he claims that the ratio 
of labour demand outside the harvest season to labour demand during harvest did not change 
substantially, so there must have been full employment outside the harvest season during the 
medieval period as well as during the modern period. Yet this is inconsistent with his 
suggestion of a ratio of 3 to 3.5 days of non-harvest labour per day of harvest labour which, 
when combined with his estimated average of 29 days per man during the harvest season for 
the years 1770-1861, yields a total of just 116 to 131 days, a lot less than his assumed 250 to 
300 days worked per year.77  
In fact, there is now a growing body of evidence to support the idea of an increase in 
WKHOHQJWKRI WKHZRUNLQJ\HDURUDQµLQGXVWULRXVUHYROXWLRQ¶ commencing sometime in the 
fifteenth century. As noted in BEG, Blanchard finds an increase in the number of days worked 
from 165 in 1433 to 259-260 in 1578-1598, while Voth finds an increase from 258 days in 
1760 to 333 days in 1830.78 Interestingly, Clark and van der Werf are in broad agreement with 
Blanchard and Voth for the periods when their data overlap. Their estimate of the average 
number of days worked per year during the period 1560-1599 is 257, which is close to 
%ODQFKDUG¶VHVWLPDWHVIRUWKHODWHsixteenth century. Similarly, their estimate of 293-311 days 
for 1867-1870, is close to 9RWK¶VILJXUHs for the nineteenth century.79 The main differences are 
two-fold. First, Blanchard finds a substantially shorter working year in 1433 at just 165 days, 
implying an earlier start to the industrious revolution.80 Second, whereas Voth finds a working 
\HDURIGD\VLQZKLFKLVDOPRVWLGHQWLFDOWR%ODQFKDUG¶VILJXUHRIGD\VLQ
Clark and van der Werf find that the working year had already risen to 312 days by 1685.81  

















Fortunately, a more continuous picture of the length of the working year over the whole 
period from 1270 to 1870 has now been provided by Humphries and Weisdorf.82 They have 
collected data on annual wage contracts rather than daily wage rates, which more accurately 
reflect annual earnings.83 By comparing annual with daily wages, they infer a working year of 
around 200 days at the opening of the fourteenth century which halved to around 100 days 
immediately following the Black Death but thereafter gradually lengthened to reach 250 days 
by the close of the seventeenth century and eventually 300 days by the 1750s. This broadly 
HQGRUVHV+DWFKHU¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWGHIODWLQJWKHGDLO\PDOHZDJH-rate series of Phelps Brown 
and Hopkins with their SULFHVHULHVFUHDWHVDQµXQUHDO¶UHDOZDJHVHULHV84 Tellingly, it deviates 
VLJQLILFDQWO\IURP&ODUN¶VDOWHUQDWLYHFDOFXODWLRQVRIDQQXDOHDUQLQJVEDVHGXSRQGDLO\ZDJH
rates and a constant work year of either 250 or 300 days but tallies with Allen and WeLVGRUI¶V
FDOFXODWLRQRIWKHQXPEHURIGD\V¶HDUQLQJVQHHGHGWRSXUFKDVHVRPHYHUVLRQRIWKHEDUH-bones 
basket of consumption required to meet the subsistence needs of a family of two adults and two 
to three children.85 And it tracks a similar path to the output-based GDP per capita series 
presented in BEG. 
Equalisation of returns 
Clark resurrects a now redundant theoretical view to infer that there had to be more arable land 
than suggested in BEG in order to equalise average output per acre across arable and pasture.86 
Whether this was attainable is another matter. As he acknowledges, there were many 
institutional restrictions on land use, as a protection against farmers maximising short-term 
profits at the expense of long-term yields.87 Further, land rents were fixed for long periods, only 
changing when land was sold or a new contract was drawn up, so that rental returns varied with 
the type and length of tenure.88 The existence of large amounts of common land, with 
communal restrictions on use, and on which no rent was paid, adds a further complication to 


















the issue.89 Nevertheless, even if there were no common land, no restrictions on land use, and 
rents were changed every year, in theory equalisation of returns should apply only at the 
margin, so there can be no presumption that average nominal output per acre should be 
equalised between arable and pasture.90  
0RUHVXUSULVLQJO\&ODUN¶VFODLPODFNVD secure empirical basis, since the functional 
division of farmland between arable and pasture is blurred, which affects the denominator in 
the calculation of output per acre on the two types of land. At a general level, in a mixed-
farming system, if farmers graze their working animals on pieces of pasture but use them for 
ploughing their arable land, should that pasture be assigned to the arable or non-arable sector?91 
The same issue applies to fallow arable used as temporary pasturage for livestock. More 
specifically, and leaving aside the mixed-IDUPLQJ LVVXH&ODUN¶VGLYLVLRQRIQRQ-arable land 
between pasture and other uses such as woodland and waste is in any case unclear. In his Figure 
7, for example, he assumes that the total farming area in 1300 was 28.2 million acres, so that 
with 12.72 million acres of arable, there would have been 15.68 million acres left over for non-
arable usesRUSHUFHQWRIIDUPODQG'HVSLWH)LJXUHFRQWDLQLQJWKHOHJHQGµSDVWXUHDQG
ZRRG¶ &ODUN LJQRUHV ZRRGODQG DQG DWWULEXWHV DOO RI WKLV to the livestock sector, which 
accounted for 48.8 per cent of the value of agricultural output in 1300, concluding that pastoral 
output per acre was only 78.3 per cent of arable output per acre. Nevertheless, as noted earlier, 
BEG HVWLPDWHG(QJODQG¶VSRWHntial agricultural area at 24 million acres, which would reduce 
the amount of pasture in 1300 to 11.28 million acres, or 47.0 per cent of total farmland.92 This 
is slightly less than the 48.8 per cent of agricultural output accounted for by the livestock sector, 
thus suggesting that output per acre in pasture was 107.5 per cent of the output per acre in 
arable, i.e. the pastoral sector was slightly more productive than the arable sector, rather than 
substantially less productive, as Clark tries to suggest in his Figure 7. It must be emphasised, 
however, that no particular significance should be attached to this result, since, as has already 
been noted, it is marginal output per acre that mattered and there is no reason to expect average 
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output per acre in arable and pasture to be equalised. It is included here simply to show that 
&ODUN¶VFODLPRILQFRQVLVWHQF\ODFNVDVWURQJHPSLULFDODVZHOODVWKeoretical basis. 
IV     CONCLUSIONS 
&ODUN¶VYLVLRQRIlate-medieval England is fraught with contradictions. First, according to him, 
the country was surfeited with arable land ² more than at any subsequent date ² and yet 
VXIIHUHGWKHZRUVWIRRGFULVHVDQGORZHVWDJULFXOWXUDOUHDOZDJHUDWHVLQWKHFRXQWU\¶Vrecorded 
history.93 Second, much of the land that he envisages having been brought into cultivation 
could hardly have been fit for the purpose, and would necessarily have been at the expense of 
the vital pastoral sector, yet notwithstanding the ecological risks thereby incurred he sees 
agricultural output as remaining high and buoyant. Third, so vast an arable area would have 
meant that in many regions the amount of arable would have been far in excess of local needs, 
at a time when possibilities for trading grain between regions were limited and net grain exports 
were negligible. Rather, it was pastoral products ² wool and hides ² that constituted the 
FRXQWU\¶Vprincipal exports until the late fifteenth century. Fourth, following the Black Death, 
ZKHQRQ&ODUN¶VRZQHVWLPDWHVWKH population more than halved, he believes that agricultural 
output scarcely shrank at all. Fifth, according to Clark, both before and after the Black Death 
farm labourers worked a full working year of 300 days irrespective of whether they needed to 
or sufficient employment was available. Sixth, even with a peak medieval population of 5.98 
million in the 1310s, Clark sees conditions of full employment invariably existing at harvest 
time, so that iQWKDWUHVSHFWFRQGLWLRQVRI0DOWKXVLDQµRYHUSRSXODWLRQ¶never prevailed.94 Yet 
according to him this was a Malthusian economy with the result that GDP per head was at a 
maximum in the mid fifteenth century when the population was at a minimum and the European 
economy was in the grip of a deepening commercial recession.95 Seventh, at that time, on his 
reckoning, England was already at least as rich as it would be in the early nineteenth century, 
when the country had a per capita income of around $2,000 in 1990 international prices, which 
is about five times bare-bones subsistence and would have been enough to make it the richest 
country in the world.96 Improbably, this would have put mid-fifteenth-century England ahead 
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of the far more developed and urbanised economy of central and northern Italy and the 
economically most advanced regions of eastern China.97 ,Q&ODUN¶VZRUOGonce the population 
began to recover from the 1500s the country did not return to this apogee of per capita 
prosperity until the very end of the nineteenth century, long after it had been launched on the 
path of modern economic growth. 
,QSODFHRI&ODUN¶Vpessimistic picture of Malthusian fluctuations without trend, BEG 
provides a historically credible alternative of England developing from an underdeveloped 
backwater of Europe in the late thirteenth century to the hub of the global economy by the late 
nineteenth century and changing profoundly in structure in the process. In the preface to the 
book we wrote:  
µLike Deane and Cole before us, we both hope and expect that the data assembled, 
methods employed, assumptions made and estimates derived will prompt debate and 
provoke and stimulate others to undertake more work and in due course come up with 
a more robust set of results¶.98  
Promising signs that this is happening are beginning to emerge. Humphries and Weisdorf and 
Stephenson challenge the narrow interpretation of the daily real wage series first introduced by 
Phelps Brown and Hopkins.99 Allen suggests further refinements to the social tables.100 Dyer, 
Langdon, Slavin and La Poutré explore medieval agricultural output outside the demesne 
sector.101 Kelly and Ó Gráda, Meredith and Oxley, and Harris and others debate levels of food 
consumption per head.102 Shaw-Taylor and Wrigley, Keibek, and Wallis and others are working 
on the shifting occupational structure of England.103 Palma charts the contribution of the money 
supply to the growth process.104 Crafts and Mills, Nuvolari and Ricci, and Groth and Persson 
























are all assessing the growth patterns suggested by the new series and probing the underlying 
assumptions.105 None of this work is consistent with the old Malthusian view, which Clark, 
clinging to a narrow interpretation of the daily real wage series, is seeking to reinstate. The 
tide, however, is against him: his estimates are contradicted by just about every other recent 
indicator of long-run development, all of which show a steady upward trend.106   
It is surely time now to abandon the Malthusian interpretation of the British economy 
before the nineteenth century, recognise that daily real wage rates are less diagnostic of annual 
earnings and general economic trends than once thought, and concentrate on refining the story 
of pre-industrial growth and development and extending it to other well-documented 
economies.107 Contrary to the Malthus delusion of Clark, the industrial revolution was not the 
beginning of development, but rather the culmination of a long, slow and uneven process 
reaching back at least as far as the late medieval period and by no means confined to Britain. 
In England, DJULFXOWXUH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKLVSURFHVVZDVWRUDLVHRXWSXWPRUH-or-less in step 
with domestic demand and, through improvements in labour productivity, release labour to 
other more dynamic employment sectors. There was little about this that was dramatic but the 
progress that resulted was undoubtedly real. 
  











TABLE 1: Annual growth rates of English agricultural output and population according to 
Clark and British economic growth  






1300-1400 -0.01 -0.60  -0.40 -0.82 
1400-1500 -0.01 -0.04  0.14 0.06 
1500-1600 0.23 0.43  0.48 0.63 
1600-1700 0.21 0.17  0.30 0.21 
1700-1800 0.04 0.54  0.70 0.54 
1800-1870 0.69 1.31  0.73 1.31 
Sources: Clarkµ0DFURHFRQRPLFDJJUHJDWHV¶Clarkµ*URZWKRUVWDJQDWLRQ"¶Broadberry and others, 




FIGURE 1: Annual growth rates of English agricultural output according to Clark and BEG 
and of population according to BEG (% per annum) 
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FIGURE 2: English agricultural output, 1270s-1860s 
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TABLE 2: Net changes in the arable acreage between 1290 and 1871 
 







A. Arable acreage in 1871   13.83 
     
B. Arable net gains since 1290    
B1. Net gains from drainage +1.30   
B2.  Net gains from underdrainage +0.10   
B3 Net gains from lightland reclamation +1.00   
B4. Net gains from woodland conversion +0.80   
     
C. Arable net losses since 1290:    
C1. Net losses from conversion to pasture  -0.80  
C2.  Net losses from urbanisation & development  -1.00  
C3. Net losses from conversion to parkland  -0.30  
     
D. Arable acreage in 1290     12.73 
Sources and notes: derived from Broadberry and others, British economic growth, pp. 54-65, with 








TABLE 3: Population, plough teams and the estimated arable area by region in 1086 
Region Total area 
,000 acres 
Lowland 


















1.  Eastern Counties 4,707 100.0 95 2.70 25.7 3.57 
2.  NE midlands 2,464 89.7 62 3.33 20.7 3.40 
3.  Southeast 6,733 98.9 77 3.20 24.6 3.62 
4.  SW midlands 3,353 89.8 80 3.09 24.7 4.21 
5.  West midlands 2,450 88.7 57 3.49 19.8 3.83 
6.  Northeast 5,814 68.4 16 4.25 6.9 0.96 
7.  Southwest 2,527 81.5 62 3.37 20.7 3.38 
8.  Northwest 4,051 74.5 18 4.25 7.5 0.95 
England 32,100 86.6 61 3.17 19.5 2.99 
Sources and notes: Total acreage taken from Broadberry and others, British economic growth, pp. 51-
2. The lowland acreage excludes land above 200 metres, at which altitude cultivation of crops becomes 
difficult (we are grateful to Lorraine Barry for providing this information). Population taken from 
Broadberry and others, British economic growth, p. 25, based on the Domesday Survey. Assumed arable 
acres per head are linearly related to density per 1,000 lowland acres as described in the text. Arable 
acreage derived as the product of population and arable acres per head and expressed as a percentage 
of total lowland acreage. Plough teams taken from Darby, Domesday England, p. 336, adjusted to allow 
for the excluded northern counties (in Italics). 
1. Eastern counties: Cambridgeshire, Huntingdonshire, Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk. 
2. Northeast Midlands: Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Rutland. 
3. Southeast: Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Kent, 
Middlesex, Oxfordshire, Surrey, Sussex. 
4. Southwest Midlands: Dorset, Gloucestershire, Somerset, Wiltshire. 
5. West Midlands: Herefordshire, Shropshire, Warwickshire, Worcestershire. 
6. Northeast: Durham, Northumberland, Yorkshire. 
7. Southwest: Cornwall, Devon. 






TABLE 4: Arable land use as a percentage of total acreage, 1086-1871 
 Region 
(A) % of total area: (B) Indexed % of total area: 
1086 1290 1801 1871 1086 1290 1801 1871 
1 Eastern counties 25.4 58.8 49.7 63.0 100 100 100 100 
2 NE midlands 18.6 49.0 29.7 39.2 73 83 60 62 
3 Southeast 24.3 48.4 45.3 51.2 96 82 91 81 
4 SW midlands 22.1 44.9 32.2 39.0 87 76 65 62 
5 West midlands 17.4 40.2 35.7 41.9 69 68 72 67 
6 Northeast 4.6 27.6 28.7 34.1 18 47 58 54 
7 Southwest 16.7 25.0 21.6 40.6 66 43 43 64 
8 Northwest 5.5 17.4 20.5 24.5 22 30 41 39 
  England 16.7 39.4 34.6 42.8 66 67 70 68 
Sources and notes: 1086 (based on the Domesday Survey): see text and Table 3; 1290 (based on the lay 
subsidies for 1290, 1327 and 1332): Broadberry and others, British economic growth, p. 70; 1801 (based 
on the 1801 crop returns): derived from Turnerµ$UDEOH¶S 294, with the assumption of a total arable 
area of 11.35 million acres; 1871 (based on the Agricultural Returns for Great Britain): Broadberry and 
others, British economic growth, pp. 51-2, 70. The counties making up each region are listed in the 





TABLE 5: Harvest labour demands per man 
Years Harvest days per male 
worker in arable and 
pastoral agriculture 
Arable share of output 
at current prices 
Harvest days per male 
worker in arable 
agriculture 
1270 19.4 0.575 33.7 
1300 19.7 0.562 35.0 
1380 22.0 0.534 41.3 
1420 20.4 0.442 46.2 
1450 20.9 0.357 58.6 
1500 18.3 0.360 50.8 
1600 16.9 0.578 29.3 
1650 17.9 0.514 34.8 
1700 22.2 0.570 39.0 
1750 29.4 0.525 56.0 
1770 28.4 0.551 51.6 
1800 31.3 0.521 60.0 
1830 27.7 0.424 65.4 
1851 26.5 0.415 63.8 
1861 26.1 0.362 72.0 
 
Sources and notes: Harvest days per male worker in arable and pastoral agriculture: &ODUNµ*URZWKRU
VWDJQDWLRQ"¶, p.8. Our estimates differ slightly from those of Clark for some years because Clark used 
data from Broadberry et al., British economic growth, which were provided only for a limited number 
of years. These have been recalculated using the underlying data that were available for all years. Arable 
share of output at current prices: Broadberry et al., British economic growth, p. 118. Harvest days per 
male worker in arable agriculture: harvest days per male worker in arable and pastoral agriculture 







TABLE 6: (PSOR\PHQWZDJHVDQGODERXU¶VVKDUHRIRXWSXWLQ(QJOLVKDJULFXOWXUH-1850 




















1250 4.23 2.75 69.9 165 50.0 35.0 
1300 4.73 3.07 78.2 165 50.0 39.1 
1380 2.44 1.40 35.5 165 50.0 17.7 
1400 2.08 1.25 30.3 165 50.0 15.1 
1450 1.90 1.06 26.9 165 50.0 13.4 
1600 4.11 2.26 57.5 250 75.8 43.6 
1700 5.20 2.02 51.5 250 75.8 39.0 
1800 8.69 2.75 70.1 330 100.0 70.1 
1850 16.73 3.93 100.0 330 100.0 100.0 
B. Wage payments and the value of output in agriculture 
 Wage rate  










1250 1.28 5.8 2.0 1.88 2.0 
1300 1.32 6.0 2.4 2.25 2.4 
1380 2.74 12.5 2.2 2.05 2.2 
1400 3.44 15.7 2.4 1.82 1.9 
1450 3.82 17.4 2.3 1.69 1.8 
1600 7.60 34.7 15.1 12.55 13.3 
1700 10.20 46.6 18.2 18.33 19.4 
1800 19.00 86.8 60.8 72.57 76.7 
1850 21.90 100.0 100.0 94.65 100.0 
C. Share of wage payments in agricultural output 
 With industrious revolution  Without industrious revolution 
 Wage share of 
output 
(1850=100) 
Wage share of 
output (%) 
 Wage share of 
output 
(1850=100) 
Wage share of 
output (%) 
1250 103.1 41.2  206.2 82.5 
1300 99.1 39.6  198.2 79.3 
1380 102.5 41.0  205.0 82.0 
1400 123.4 49.4  246.8 98.7 
1450 130.9 52.4  261.8 104.7 
1600 114.0 45.6  150.4 60.2 
1700 93.7 37.5  123.7 49.5 
1800 79.3 31.7  79.3 31.7 




Sources and notes: Part A: Population derived from Broadberry and others, British economic growth, 
pp. 20, 227-244 for the period before 1541 and from Wrigley and Schofield, Population history, 
adjusted in line with Wrigley and others, English population history, for the period 1541-1850; 
Agricultural share of population derived from Broadberry and others, British economic growth, p. 344. 
Days worked per person from Broadberry and others, British economic growth, p. 264, based on Allen 
and Weisdorfµ:DVWKHUHDQLQGXVWULRXVUHYROXWLRQ"¶ Part B: Wage rate from Clarkµ/RQJPDUFK¶SS
99-100. Wage payments derived as total days worked from part A multiplied by the wage rate. Output 
value from Broadberry and others, British economic growth. Part C: Wage share of output, with an 
industrious revolution, derived in index number form by dividing wage payments in part B with output 
value and converted to share of output by benchmarking on the 1850 percentage from Clark, µ*URZWh 
RU VWDJQDWLRQ"¶ Wage share of output without an industrious revolution derived by repeating the 
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